Understanding Progress in Philosophy: Beyond the Myths
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Chapter 1: The Landscape of Philosophical Inquiry
In 2009, I embarked on my first academic role in philosophy as the Department Chair at Lehman College, City University of New York. Prior to this, I was a professor of evolutionary biology at Stony Brook University. One of my initial observations about my new colleagues, not just within my department but across the discipline, was their tendency to undermine their own field—something rarely seen among scientists. If biologists or physicists believed their work was unproductive, one might wonder why they continued in their professions. Yet many philosophers seem to reconcile the conflicting beliefs that their discipline is both futile and somehow rewarding.
A notable example is Chris Daly from the University of Manchester, UK, who authored an article for Aeon magazine titled "Philosophy's Lack of Progress." The subtitle reads: "For centuries, all philosophers seem to have done is question and debate. Why do philosophical problems resist solutions?" Daly, like many of his peers, appears to suffer from significant misunderstandings about the nature of philosophy and what constitutes progress within it.
While this claim might seem outrageous, asking a scientist about the essence of science and its advancement often reveals naivety that a first-year philosophy graduate could easily challenge. I have consistently observed this phenomenon.
Daly asserts that "despite [a] wealth of questions and the centuries spent tackling them, philosophers haven't successfully provided any answers." He continues, noting that attempts to address these questions are often met with criticism, exposing flaws and dubious assumptions. These critiques lead to revisions and discussions, yet new issues emerge, revealing past flaws once more.
In many ways, this description mirrors the scientific endeavor, which both philosophers and scientists agree does progress. The key question remains: how is this advancement achieved? It arises from the continual scrutiny of established theories, where flaws are identified, addressed, and debated. Historical figures like Galileo and Newton presented compelling narratives about the functioning of the world, but empirical evidence revealed shortcomings in their theories. It took Einstein and the pioneers of quantum mechanics to propose improved narratives, which too have shown limitations, leading to ongoing quests for better explanations.
Daly claims that philosophers' contributions to their own questions have not "quite made the grade." By whose standards? It seems that only philosophers themselves should serve as qualified judges, not scientists who lack a comprehensive understanding of philosophy, such as Neil deGrasse Tyson or Stephen Hawking.
Daly also notes the absence of consensus among philosophers on major questions, which he interprets as evidence of a lack of progress. However, he mistakenly equates philosophy with science, measuring philosophical advancement by scientific standards. This comparison overlooks the distinct nature of both fields. While they share intellectual territory and can inform one another, they are governed by different challenges, methodologies, and benchmarks.
Section 1.1: The Distinction Between Science and Philosophy
The primary distinction lies in their objectives. Science aims to arrive at the best provisional understanding of how the world operates. Conversely, philosophy seeks to develop various sound frameworks for contemplating specific issues.
To illustrate, consider a scientific question: What explains the diversity and history of life on Earth? Numerous theories have been proposed, from natural theological views to various evolutionary theories, including Lamarckism and Darwinism. The Modern Synthesis, established between the 1920s and 1940s, currently holds sway, although it faces criticism from advocates of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis.
Now, let’s contrast this with a philosophical question: What ethical framework should we adopt? Philosophers have offered numerous responses. Some have been dismissed, while others are considered intriguing but not mainstream. According to a survey by David Bourget and David Chalmers, the prevailing ethical theories garner significant support: 26% of professional moral philosophers endorse deontology (like Kant's), 24% back consequentialism (such as Mill's utilitarianism), and 18% favor virtue ethics (e.g., Aristotle). This indicates that three frameworks account for nearly 70% of professional support within the field.
The disparity between these two scenarios arises from the intrinsic nature of the inquiries. Scientists describe and seek to understand a presumably singular reality. They do so from a limited perspective, leading to the replacement of outdated theories with improved ones. However, it is reasonable to expect that one theory may ultimately emerge as the best, regardless of whether it has been discovered yet.
In contrast, philosophy grapples with issues that intertwine logic and empirical evidence. Ethical inquiries, for instance, revolve around how individuals can optimally navigate their lives, constrained by empirical realities that influence human flourishing. This suggests that there may be multiple pathways to a thriving society, as empirical data do not dictate a single solution. Hence, the existence of various ethical frameworks is not a shortcoming but rather an inherent aspect of philosophical inquiry.
Section 1.2: The Nature of Ethical Frameworks
To clarify, let’s draw an analogy. Imagine playing chess; numerous viable moves exist early in the game. However, as the game progresses, the options narrow significantly. According to the aforementioned survey, a consensus has emerged in metaphysics: 82% of professional metaphysicians are realists regarding the external world.
Nicholas Rescher, in a seminal 1978 paper, described the varying philosophical solutions as "aporetic clusters." These clusters comprise competing solutions or frameworks for a given philosophical problem. Each cluster undergoes scrutiny, refinement, and potential rejection or acceptance—a process that exemplifies philosophical progress.
Philosophical discourse often involves supportive arguments that do not preclude alternatives, unlike scientific inquiry, where a compelling case for one answer typically discounts others. For a biologist, it is logical to question whether the Darwinian theory of evolution is "true." Similarly, a physicist may assert that General Relativity better captures reality than Newtonian mechanics.
Conversely, it would be perplexing to label ethical frameworks—such as deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics—as "true." Instead, we should evaluate their internal coherence and their utility in helping individuals flourish.
The distinction between science and philosophy elucidates why some philosophers, like Daly, misunderstand the nature of philosophical progress. It is crucial to recognize that philosophy does evolve and that comparing it to scientific progress is fundamentally misguided.
Chapter 2: Delving Deeper into Philosophical Progress
The first video, "Philosophy Makes Progress," provides insights into how philosophical thought evolves and challenges misconceptions surrounding its effectiveness.
The second video, "Philosophy & What Matters. Ep. 9: Philosophical Progress with Daniel Stoljar (ANU)," explores the nuances of philosophical advancement and the significance of ongoing debates.
Digging deeper: the Gettier problem
The term "knowledge" encompasses varied meanings. For instance, I might "know" my friend Phil or how to cook a particular dish. However, epistemology focuses on propositional knowledge—expressed as "S knows that p." Traditionally, this has been viewed as requiring three components: justification, truth, and belief (JTB). Although it is debated whether Plato himself fully endorsed this view, it has served as a foundational perspective for centuries.
In the latter half of the 20th century, challenges to the JTB definition emerged, collectively known as Gettier cases. These cases illustrate scenarios where justified true belief does not equate to knowledge.
The exploration of these aporetic clusters began with Edmund Gettier's brief paper from 1963, which questioned the adequacy of the JTB definition. An example of a Gettier case might involve observing documents that suggest Phil lives in New York City. While my belief about Phil's residence would be justified and true, it turns out he actually lives on Long Island, creating a contradiction in the JTB framework.
The first response to these cases was to amend the definition of knowledge to exclude reliance on false premises. However, more complex Gettier scenarios have since challenged this revision, leading to further discussions on the nature of justification and belief.
As we continue to navigate the complexities of knowledge, it becomes evident that philosophical inquiry is not about finding singular answers but rather exploring a spectrum of logically coherent possibilities.
In conclusion, the journey through the Gettier problem and philosophical progress illustrates the richness of philosophical discourse and its evolving nature. As we engage with these concepts, we cultivate a deeper appreciation for the intricate landscape of knowledge and the myriad ways in which philosophy continues to advance.